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I. Introduction
“If it’s a new test, why can’t they use it?”1
This comment by Judge George B. Daniels of the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York fits a wealth of
controversy into just a few words.2 With the Supreme Court’s
apparent limiting of general personal jurisdiction in Daimler AG
v. Bauman3 in January of 2014, defendants across the country
began attempts to have the cases against them dismissed on the
grounds that the particular courts could no longer exercise general
personal jurisdiction over them.4 These defendants believe that the
Daimler interpretation of general personal jurisdiction
fundamentally changed the previously controlling Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown5 test, and several judges
in federal district courts agree.6 Spurring the controversy,
however, are judges operating under the assumption that Daimler
did not change the already existing Goodyear test and thus,
denying dismissals to other defendants in the same situation.7
Judge Daniels’s position depends on the assumption—one that he
1. Pete Brush, Daimler Ruling Comes to Banks’ Aid in Yen-Libor Action,
LAW360 (Sept. 30, 2014, 3:40 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/582588 (last
visited Sept. 28, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. See id. (noting that the judge lacked sympathy for the plaintiff’s claim
that the “defendants had waived jurisdictional defenses regardless of Daimler by
not asserting them earlier in the more than two-year-old case”).
3. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
4. See infra Part IV.A (describing cases in which judges granted such
dismissals and others in which judges denied such dismissals).
5. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
6. See infra Part IV.A (describing the cases in which judges granted
dismissals based on lack on general personal jurisdiction).
7. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that these denials of dismissals occur in
cases in which defendants previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense).
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thinks is obvious—that Daimler did create a new test.8 The
problem, however, is that others persuasively argue that the
Daimler and Goodyear tests are the same.9 Apart from the issue of
whether Daimler created a new test, Judge Daniels’s comment also
encapsulates the separate issue of whether—even if Daimler
created a new test—defendants are entitled to relief under the new
case, especially if they have already waived the personal
jurisdiction defense of Rule 12(b)(2).10 This Note proceeds by
reconciling these two issues in an attempt to propose the correct
outcome for litigants regarding the treatment of Daimler in longpending cases.11
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Daimler was a further
development of Goodyear and personal jurisdiction law.12 In
delivering the Court’s ruling, Justice Ginsburg declared, “[T]he
inquiry under Goodyear is not whether a foreign corporation’s inforum contacts can be said to be in some sense ‘continuous and
systematic,’ it is whether that corporation’s ‘affiliations with the
State are so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially
at home in the forum State.’”13 Despite the apparent intention to
clarify the existing law on general jurisdiction, the Daimler ruling
incited disagreement as to the extent the Goodyear rule changed
as a result of Daimler and even as to whether Daimler changed the
Goodyear rule at all.14 Some argue that Daimler created a much
8. See infra Part II.C (explaining the controversy over the relationship
between Goodyear and Daimler).
9. See infra Part II.C (noting the argument that Goodyear already
pronounced the standard repeated in Daimler).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2) (providing that a party must raise a defense
based on lack of personal jurisdiction in the responsive pleading); infra Part III
(explaining the development of retroactivity law).
11. See infra Part IV (proposing that Daimler must be applied retroactively
even when defendants previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense).
12. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (“Goodyear did
not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum
where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business; it simply typed
those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”).
13. Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
14. Compare Donald Earl Childress III, General Jurisdiction After Bauman,
66 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 197, 199 (2014) (“The Court meant what it said in
Goodyear: general jurisdiction should be limited, except in an exceptional case, to
a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”), and Case
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stricter test for general jurisdiction than was previously in
existence, but others counter that the Daimler decision simply
restated the existing Goodyear rule.15
The disagreement over Daimler’s significance is especially
problematic in long-pending cases in which defendants have
moved for dismissals on the grounds that personal jurisdiction no
longer exists because of the apparently stricter Daimler test.16 To
decide whether to grant or deny such motions to dismiss, judges
must first determine whether the defendant already waived the
personal jurisdiction defense and, if so, whether the waiver will
preclude the application of the Daimler test.17 These
determinations require the judge to decide whether the new
personal jurisdiction test applies retroactively and whether any
previous waiver matters in the face of a new constitutional
pronouncement.18 Then, if the judge allows the defendant to use
the Daimler test and agrees that personal jurisdiction no longer
exists under Daimler, the judge will often have the option to either
dismiss the relevant claims or transfer the claims if there is
another jurisdiction where personal jurisdiction does exist under
Daimler.19
Comment, Personal Jurisdiction—General Jurisdiction—Daimler AG v. Bauman,
128 HARV. L. REV. 311, 311 (2014) (arguing that Justice Ginsburg applied the
same personal jurisdiction theory in both Goodyear and Daimler), with Linda S.
Mullenix, Personal Jurisdiction Stops Here: Cabining the Extraterritorial Reach
of American Courts, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 705, 707–08 (2014) (identifying Daimler
as part of the recent trend of “declining to allow the extraterritorial reach of
American courts over foreign nationals as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction”
rather than a clarification of Goodyear), and Eric H. Weisblatt & Claire Frezza,
Who to Sue and Where in ANDA Litigation: Personal Jurisdiction Post-Daimler,
69 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 351, 351–52 (2014) (stressing that Daimler provides a “new
rule for general jurisdiction” that requires “a stricter analysis of where a
defendant company is ‘at home’ sufficient to cause it to be haled into court under
general jurisdiction principles”).
15. See sources cited supra note 14 (providing examples of scholars’ opposing
positions as to whether Daimler states a new test or simply restates the Goodyear
test).
16. See infra Part IV (noting in particular that statutes of limitations can
prevent plaintiffs from litigating the case again).
17. See infra Part IV (explaining that the decision is much less complex in
cases in which there was no waiver).
18. See infra Part IV (arguing that waiver does not matter in the face of a
new constitutional pronouncement).
19. See infra Part IV (arguing that judges should choose transfer over
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In arguing that Daimler created a new test, some defendants
have raised new personal jurisdiction defenses and achieved
dismissals.20 Other defendants, however, have raised the same
defenses and been denied dismissals.21 Dismissals resulting from
the Daimler decision have been granted even when the case has
been pending for years and the plaintiff sued under personal
jurisdiction that was in accord with case law at the time.22 One
judge even granted a dismissal despite the ability to transfer the
case instead.23
This Note argues that courts should apply the Daimler
decision when defendants raise this newly available personal
jurisdiction defense.24 In light of both personal jurisdiction law and
retroactivity law, this Note argues that courts should permit
defendants to use the new Daimler test even when the defendant
did not raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense and thus waived the personal
jurisdiction defense.25 This argument is qualified, however, by the
additional argument that courts should refrain from dismissing
the case based on a lack of personal jurisdiction under Daimler in
favor of transferring the case when possible.26 Choosing transfer
over dismissal when possible would mitigate the unfairness to
dismissal when possible).
20. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (granting defendant’s
motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction in light of the Daimler
ruling); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2014)
(determining that, in light of Daimler, the district court erred in finding that it
could exercise general jurisdiction over the appellant bank).
21. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284D, 2014 WL 4471606, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept 10, 2014) (denying dismissal based
on defendant’s previous waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense); Gilmore v.
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2014) (denying
dismissal based in part on the argument that Daimler did not change the law as
it was already stated in Goodyear).
22. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (denying
transfer request even though the venue plaintiff requested had personal
jurisdiction over defendant).
23. See id. (describing a situation in which transfer was an option).
24. See infra Part IV.A (noting that this should be the result regardless of
whether the defendant previously waived the personal jurisdiction defense).
25. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that Daimler was a new constitutional
pronouncement and thus applies retroactively).
26. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the unfairness of dismissal in the context
of long-pending cases).
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plaintiffs of having their claims in long-pending cases barred by
statutes of limitations.27 If the claim is dismissed and the statute
of limitations has expired, the plaintiff will not be able to bring the
claim again in a jurisdiction where there is personal jurisdiction
under Daimler.28
Part II of this Note examines the development of personal
jurisdiction,29 and Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s
treatment of retroactivity.30 Part IV argues that defendants should
be allowed to raise the new Daimler personal jurisdiction
argument even when they failed to raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Daimler.31 Part IV then
examines the consequences of allowing defendants to do this in
long-pending cases and concludes by proposing that—out of
fairness to plaintiffs—cases should be transferred rather than
dismissed when possible.32
II. Development of Personal Jurisdiction Law: Goodyear to
Daimler
A. Pre-Goodyear Personal Jurisdiction
Before 2011, most personal jurisdiction jurisprudence focused
on specific jurisdiction, not general jurisdiction.33 The Court first
began to distinguish between what came to be known as specific
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction in 1945 with International
27. See infra Part IV.B (noting that transfer will not always be possible).
28. See infra Part IV.B (emphasizing the unfairness of this outcome if
transfer was an option).
29. See infra Part II (focusing on the relationship between Goodyear and
Daimler).
30. See infra Part III (focusing on the current state of adjudicative
retroactivity law).
31. See infra Part IV (emphasizing that new constitutional pronouncements
always apply retroactively).
32. See infra Part IV (noting that this preferable result is not always
possible).
33. See Camilla Cohen, Case Comment, Goodyear Dunlop’s Failed Attempt
to Refine the Scope of General Personal Jurisdiction, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1405, 1406
(2013) (emphasizing the limited scope and clarity of general jurisdiction case law
before the Court decided Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in
2011).
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Shoe Co. v. Washington.34 The case involved a suit brought by the
state of Washington against a defendant that failed to contribute
to the state unemployment compensation fund.35 The state
statutes required the defendant to make annual contributions to
the fund based on its employees’ services in the state.36
International Shoe Co. was a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Missouri, but had manufacturing and
distribution branches in other states, including Washington.37
International Shoe Co. argued that the presence of its salesmen in
Washington was not sufficient for the “presence” requirement of
personal jurisdiction and that, consequently, the company was not
subject to jurisdiction in Washington.38
The Court disagreed with International Shoe Co.’s presence
argument and created a new test for general personal
jurisdiction—the minimum contacts test—which requires a
defendant to have sufficient minimum contacts with the state
“such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”39 In creating this test,
the Court distinguished between specific and general jurisdiction
for the first time, holding that International Shoe Co. was subject
to specific jurisdiction in Washington because the activities
conducted by the employees in Washington gave rise to the suit.40
The Court distinguished this definition of specific jurisdiction with
its characterization of general jurisdiction as follows:

34. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)
(distinguishing between specific and general jurisdiction on the basis that where
there is not continuous activity in the forum state, suits must be related to the
activity, but where there is continuous activity in the forum state, suits can be
entirely unrelated to the activity).
35. See id. at 311 (noting that the state unemployment compensation fund
was “enacted by state statutes”).
36. See id. at 312 (defining the required contribution as “a specified
percentage of the wages payable annually” to the employee).
37. See id. at 313 (noting also that the defendant has no office in Washington
and “makes no contracts either for sale or purchase of merchandise there”).
38. See id. at 314–15 (emphasizing that the presence requirement must be
satisfied for there to be jurisdiction by the state courts).
39. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
40. See id. at 320 (“The obligation which is here sued upon arose out of those
very activities.”).
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While it has been held in cases on which appellant relies that
continuous activity of some sorts within a state is not enough to
support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits
unrelated to that activity, there have been instances in which
the continuous corporate operations within a state were
thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely
distinct from those activities.41

This first articulation of general jurisdiction adopted a new
analysis based on “continuous and systematic” activities, but did
not define what constitutes sufficiently continuous and systematic
contacts with the jurisdiction.42 In later decisions culminating with
Daimler, the Court repeatedly attempted to define the bounds of
general jurisdiction.43
The only two cases analyzing the scope of general personal
jurisdiction prior to 2011 were Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated
Mining Co.44 in 1952 and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v.
Hall45 in 1984.46 In Perkins, the Court held that general
jurisdiction was appropriate because there was corporate
headquarters-level activity by the defendant in the forum state.47
The Court explained that it used the International Shoe analysis
to reach this holding, but did not provide a detailed account of the
Court’s reasoning in determining that the facts of the case satisfied
the International Shoe analysis.48 Helicopteros involved a wrongful
41. Id. at 318 (citations omitted).
42. See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the
Language of General Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 979–80 (2012)
(indicating that future decisions would necessarily clarify the general jurisdiction
analysis).
43. See infra Parts II.B–C (focusing on the extent to which Daimler built on
the Goodyear standard for general personal jurisdiction).
44. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
45. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
46. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1406 (“Consequently, lower courts were left
to develop the contours of general personal jurisdiction, resulting in a hodgepodge
of inconsistent holdings that often conflated several important distinctions
between specific and general jurisdiction.”).
47. See Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445 (“The amount and kind of activities which
must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the state of the forum so as to
make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the jurisdiction of that
state are to be determined in each case.”).
48. See Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 977 (noting that the Court offered “little
further reasoning beyond quotation of International Shoe’s discussion of suits on
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death suit brought in Texas courts against the corporate
Colombian owner of a helicopter that crashed in Peru, killing four
U.S. citizen passengers.49 The Court held that the defendant’s
contacts with the forum state of Texas were insufficient to support
a conclusion of general jurisdiction because they were not
continuous and systematic.50 In reaching this holding, the Court
disagreed with the Texas Supreme Court’s assessment that the
corporation’s Texas purchases and training trips constituted
sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction.51
It is difficult to reconcile Helicopteros and Perkins because
Helicopteros failed to explain why the contacts in Perkins were
stronger than those in Helicopteros in a manner that would provide
other courts with any framework for analyzing general jurisdiction
under different sets of facts.52 The apparent new test for whether
a defendant has “the kind of continuous and systematic general
business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins” left much
open to interpretation by the lower courts.53 Perkins made clear
that “[c]ontacts warranting a conclusion that the forum state was
the defendant’s principal place of business” justified the exercise of
general jurisdiction, and Helicopteros explained that “purchases of
millions of dollars worth of products and training over a seven-year
period in the forum state were not sufficient.”54 The very limited
scope of these examples, however, left lower courts without

causes of action arising from dealings distinct from forum activities, and a lengthy
factual description of the defendant’s activities in Ohio”).
49. See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 409–10 (noting that the corporation’s
principal place of business was also in Colombia and that its business was
“providing helicopter transportation for oil and construction companies in South
America”).
50. See id. at 416 (examining all of the defendant’s contacts with the Texas
forum in turn and concluding that they do not “constitute the kind of continuous
and systematic general business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins”).
51. See id. at 417 (declaring that Rosenberg Brothers & Co. v. Curtis Brown
Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923), “makes clear that purchases and related trips, standing
alone, are not a sufficient basis for a State’s assertion of jurisdiction”).
52. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1411 (explaining that both the Perkins and
Helicopteros opinions simply listed the defendants’ contacts with the forum in
each case without any meaningful discussion as to why some contacts were
considered stronger than others).
53. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984).
54. Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 979–80.
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direction on how to apply the cases to other situations.55 This
confusion required the Court to provide additional guidance on the
general jurisdiction analysis in subsequent decisions.56
B. General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
The Court in Goodyear established that general jurisdiction
could be exerted over a defendant corporation only when the
corporation is fairly regarded as “at home” in the forum state. 57
In that case, a bus accident in France killed two minor North
Carolina residents, and the estates of the minors brought suit
against Goodyear USA and its foreign subsidiaries for producing
the defective bus tire.58 The foreign subsidiaries moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction and the North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s denial of the motion. 59 The
Supreme Court disagreed with the North Carolina court’s streamof-commerce analysis on the basis that “ties serving to bolster the
exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination
that, based on those ties, the forum has general jurisdiction over
a defendant.”60 The Court ultimately concluded that general
personal jurisdiction, unlike specific personal jurisdiction,

55. See id. at 979 (noting that lower courts have reached a “wide variety of
results” using International Shoe, Perkins, and Helicopteros as guidance).
56. See infra Parts II.B–C (explaining how Goodyear and then Daimler
provided this necessary guidance).
57. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846,
2857 (2011) (declaring that petitioners were not at home in North Carolina
because “[t]heir attenuated connections to the State . . . fall far short of the
‘continuous and systematic general business contacts’ necessary to entertain a
suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the
State” (quoting Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416)).
58. See id. at 2850 (noting that the named defendants included Goodyear
USA and three of its subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg).
59. See id. (explaining the determination of the Court of Appeals that the
higher threshold for general jurisdiction was crossed “when petitioners placed
their tires ‘in the stream of interstate commerce without any limitation on the
extent to which those tires could be sold in North Carolina’” (quoting Brown v.
Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (2009))).
60. Id. at 2855.
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requires more than continuous activity within a state. 61 The
defendant must be at home in the forum. 62
This rule for general jurisdiction as stated in Goodyear did not,
however, provide the lower courts with meaningful guidance for
deciding future general jurisdiction issues.63 The opinion makes
clear that general jurisdiction can no longer be based solely on
regular sales within the forum and that general jurisdiction
requires a significantly higher connection to a forum than specific
jurisdiction.64 Yet, the opinion is much less clear on what is
required for a defendant to be at home in a forum.65 The opinion
suggests that a corporate defendant will be considered at home
only in its state of incorporation and principal place of business,
but does not explicitly state such strict limitations for general
jurisdiction.66 This suggestion creates additional problems for
plaintiffs wishing to litigate against foreign corporations in the
United States. Such restrictions would entirely preclude a plaintiff
from bringing suit in any U.S. forum.67 The Court addressed this
unique issue three years after the Goodyear decision in Daimler.68
61. See id. at 2856 (emphasizing that continuous activity of any sort will not
necessarily be sufficient for general personal jurisdiction).
62. See id. (explaining that the defendant’s ties to the forum State must
“render them essentially at home” there).
63. See Cohen, supra note 33, at 1406–07 (“While the decision may be
interpreted as refining the test for asserting general jurisdiction, Goodyear could
just as easily be narrowly confined to its facts in light of the manner in which the
Court framed the issues.”).
64. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 549
(2012) (arguing that the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction
makes “clear that limited sales do not satisfy the ‘substantial’ activity or
‘continuous and systematic’ contacts required for general jurisdiction”).
65. See Pielemeier, supra note 42, at 990 (“[T]he opinion signals that other
bases for general jurisdiction will need to entail substantial contacts warranting
the conclusion that the defendant is ‘at home’ in the forum.”).
66. See id. (explaining that the oral argument transcript shows that several
justices suggested general jurisdiction would be limited to the defendant’s state
of incorporation and principal place of business).
67. See id. at 991 (suggesting that a better test for foreign corporate
defendants would find “a place where they are ‘at home’ in the United States”).
68. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 (2014) (holding that
California could not exercise general jurisdiction over a German corporation
because the corporation was not incorporated in California and did not have its
principal place of business in California).
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C. General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler

In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court reversed the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision that personal
jurisdiction existed over the defendant German corporation,
Daimler AG.69 Twenty-two Argentinian residents sued Daimler
AG under the Alien Tort Statute70 and the Torture Victim
Protection Act71 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California.72 The plaintiffs alleged that a Daimler AG
subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina, collaborated with
perpetrators of Argentina’s Dirty War to harm and kill employees
of the Argentinian subsidiary and those employees’ families.73
These Argentinian victims asserted that the Northern District of
California had jurisdiction over Daimler AG because of the
California contacts of another Daimler AG subsidiary, MercedesBenz USA, LLC (MBUSA).74 Daimler AG moved to dismiss in the
Northern District of California for lack of personal jurisdiction,
arguing that the California contacts of the U.S. subsidiary were
not a sufficient basis for subjecting the foreign corporation to the
court’s general jurisdiction.75 The U.S. subsidiary was incorporated
in Delaware, had its principal place of business in New Jersey, had
several offices in California, and distributed its vehicles to many
69. See id. at 753 (explaining that the Ninth Circuit based its ruling on the
apparent satisfaction of the agency test).
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
71. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.
73 (1992) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)) (“An individual who,
under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation subjects
an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that
individual.”).
72. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (noting that claims were also filed under
the laws of California and Argentina for wrongful death and intentional infliction
of emotional distress).
73. See id. at 751–52 (emphasizing that none of the incidents in the
complaint occurred in the United States).
74. See id. at 752 (explaining that MBUSA purchases vehicles from Daimler
AG in Germany and imports them to the United States for resale).
75. See id. (explaining that in response to the motion, plaintiffs “submitted
declarations and exhibits purporting to demonstrate the presence of Daimler
itself in California”).
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parts of the United States, including California.76 The district
court determined that the distribution of vehicles to California was
insufficient to exert personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG and
granted Daimler AG’s motion to dismiss, but the Ninth Circuit
disagreed and reversed.77
In reversing the Ninth Circuit ruling, the Supreme Court
addressed “whether a foreign corporation may be subjected to a
court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state
subsidiary.”78 In the course of establishing that Daimler AG was
not at home in the forum state, the Court never expressly
addressed the Ninth Circuit’s agency theory that appeared “to
subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they
have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would
sweep beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we
rejected in Goodyear.”79 Although the Court probably would have
rejected the agency theory, it did not reach the issue because—
even assuming that the U.S. subsidiary was at home in
California—Daimler AG’s California contacts were nonetheless too
slim to render the foreign corporation at home in the state.80 The
Court also addressed the transnational issues that it failed to
address comprehensively in Goodyear.81 The Court justified its
strict interpretation of Goodyear in part because of the risks a more
lenient interpretation would have on international comity.82
There has been much debate over what exactly the Daimler
Court accomplished with its ruling.83 Some scholars argue that the
76. See id. (“MBUSA has multiple California-based facilities, including a
regional office in Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a
Classic Center in Irvine.”).
77. See id. (“[O]ver 10% of all sales of new vehicles in the United States take
place in California, and MBUSA’s California sales account for 2.4% of Daimler’s
worldwide sales.”).
78. Id. at 759.
79. Id. at 760.
80. See id. at 759 (“Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of affiliations
with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there.”).
81. See id. at 762 (noting that the Ninth Circuit “paid little heed to the risks
to international comity its expansive view of general jurisdiction posed”).
82. See id. at 763 (explaining that other nations have more limited
approaches to personal jurisdiction and “that subjecting Daimler AG to general
jurisdiction in California would not accord with the ‘fair play and substantial
justice’ due process demands”).
83. See, e.g., Childress III, supra note 14, at 201–02 (examining what the
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Daimler decision imposed additional limitations on personal
jurisdiction beyond the limitations imposed by Goodyear.84 Other
scholars take the position that Daimler simply reiterated the
already-existing Goodyear test.85 On the one hand, the fact that the
Ninth Circuit made its decision before the Goodyear ruling—and
had it made the decision after Goodyear, it likely would have
decided differently—supports those advocating for the latter
position.86 In light of the Goodyear ruling, the Daimler plaintiffs
overreach “[i]n asking the court to essentially go back to the
drawing board and ignore the specific showings required by
general personal jurisdiction.”87 On the other hand, the fact that
Goodyear did not specifically address how vicarious jurisdiction
fits into the “essentially at home” standard supports those
advocating for the former position.88 This is particularly relevant
Daimler court failed to address and what will be the grounds for future general
jurisdiction disagreements); Hoffheimer, supra note 64, at 551–52 (arguing that
the decision could support both a flexible approach “that approves general
jurisdiction in multiple states where a foreign corporation has strong permanent
connections” and a restrictive approach “that limits general jurisdiction to the
place of incorporation and . . . the principal place of business”).
84. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 14, at 707–08 (identifying Daimler as part
of the recent trend of “declining to allow the extraterritorial reach of American
courts over foreign nationals as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction” rather
than a clarification of Goodyear); Weisblatt & Frezza, supra note 14, at 351–52
(stressing that Daimler provides a “new rule for general jurisdiction” that
requires “a stricter analysis of where a defendant company is ‘at home’ sufficient
to cause it to be haled into court under general jurisdiction principles”).
85. See, e.g., Childress III, supra note 14, at 199 (“The Court meant what it
said in Goodyear: general jurisdiction should be limited, except in an exceptional
case, to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of business.”);
Case Comment, supra note 14, at 311 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg applied the
same personal jurisdiction theory in both Goodyear and Daimler).
86. See Todd W. Noelle, Supreme Court Commentary, At Home in the Outer
Limits: DaimlerChrysler v. Bauman and the Bounds of General Personal
Jurisdiction, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 17, 40 (2013) (“Unless the
Court decides to expand its general jurisdiction jurisprudence far beyond where
it currently stands, the Court will almost certainly reverse.”).
87. Id. at 41.
88. See Lonny Hoffman, Further Thinking About Vicarious Jurisdiction:
Reflecting on Goodyear v. Brown and Looking Ahead to Daimler v. Bauman, 34
U. PA. J. INT’L L. 765, 782 (2013) (“[T]he key question remaining is whether there
is anything in Goodyear’s articulation of the ‘essentially at home standard’ that
would preclude the kind of excessive vicarious jurisdiction exercises that courts
frequently permit.”). In this context, the term “vicarious jurisdiction” describes
“any attempt that is made to impute the contacts of one person or entity to
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for foreign corporations such as Daimler AG because “the
distinction between domestic and foreign entities indeed may have
been precisely what the [Goodyear] Court had in mind when it
intentionally left the door more ajar than it otherwise needed.”89
This observation renders plausible the argument that Daimler did
create a new general personal jurisdiction test—one that is
particularly important for foreign defendants—rather than simply
restating the already existing Goodyear test.90
Both of the aforementioned positions demonstrate merit. The
confusion as to the relationship between Goodyear and Daimler
has resulted in inconsistent results among lower courts in dealing
with defendants’ recent assertions of Daimler in long-pending
cases.91 The most logical way to reconcile the two positions—and
the recommendation of this Note—is to conclude that Daimler is
not inconsistent with Goodyear because Daimler builds off of the
earlier Goodyear test.92 In building off of Goodyear, however,
Daimler does provide its own distinct test that offers more specific
guidance to lower courts on how to apply the at home standard,
especially to foreign corporate defendants.93 The previous lack of
clarification on how to apply the somewhat cryptic Goodyear test
to these specific types of defendants led many courts and litigants
to believe that the test was more lenient than the Court meant it
to be when it decided Goodyear.94 Daimler necessarily developed a
another.” Id. at 765. The term is most often associated with corporate entities
such as Daimler AG, especially “when the plaintiff tries to establish jurisdiction
over a nonresident corporate parent by looking to the forum activities of its
subsidiaries.” Id. at 765–66.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 783 (arguing that the Ninth Circuit’s Daimler ruling “stretches
the reasonableness of exercising general jurisdiction vicariously beyond any
constitutional limit that Justice Ginsburg’s Goodyear opinion can plausibly be
read to recognize”).
91. See infra Part IV (arguing that these inconsistent results are a
consequence of misunderstandings as to the relevant personal jurisdiction and
retroactivity law).
92. See Stephanie Denker, Comment, The Future of General Jurisdiction:
The Effects of Daimler AG v. Bauman, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 145, 162
(2014) (arguing that Daimler does not overrule Goodyear, but rather clarifies it).
93. See id. (“The Court’s reliance on Goodyear’s ‘at home’ standard and the
Court’s application of the paradigm forum states in the Goodyear opinion
indicates its reluctance to stray from precedent.”).
94. See Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952-GAO,
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clearer and more specific test because many courts were applying
Goodyear incorrectly.95 Thus, Daimler does constitute a new
constitutional pronouncement even though is it not inconsistent
with Goodyear.96 This Note’s subsequent arguments elaborate on
the logic of this proposed reconciliation.97
III. Retroactivity and Exceptions to Retroactivity
A. Adjudicative Retroactivity Versus Legislative Retroactivity
In any discussion of retroactivity doctrine, the distinction
between adjudicative retroactivity and legislative retroactivity is
critical.98 An analysis of adjudicative retroactivity requires
recognition of the fact that judicial decisions concern three
different types of law: statutes, common law, and the
Constitution.99 Adjudicative retroactivity as to the interpretation
of federal statutes has always been considered appropriate because
the language of the rules does not change as a result of the judicial
decision; the new decision simply declares that previous
interpretations of the language were wrong.100 Adjudicative
retroactivity as to the common law is unique because—unlike with
statutes—the positive source of the law is the evolution of the
judicial decisions themselves.101
2014 WL 4964506, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (demonstrating a situation in
which a judge found personal jurisdiction to exist in its earlier application of
Goodyear, but not later when the defendant raised Daimler).
95. See id. (describing how the judge reached different conclusions using the
Goodyear and Daimler versions of the general personal jurisdiction test).
96. See Denker, supra note 92, at 162 (emphasizing that the underlying
premise is the same in both Goodyear and Daimler).
97. See infra Part IV.A (explaining that Daimler must be applied
retroactively because it is a development of Goodyear and thus, a new
constitutional pronouncement).
98. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory Is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth
of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (1999) (differentiating
between several sources of law).
99. See id. (“The differing positive sources of the law being changed impart
a different character to each type of decision.”).
100. See id. (“Consequently, retroactivity in statutory interpretation is not
very difficult.”).
101. See id. (“With no positive source independent of judicial decisions, the
law must change as the decisions change. Consequently, it makes sense to
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The interpretation of constitutional law is analogous to
common law in that the law is the evolution of judicial decisions.102
While the Constitution itself is a source of positive law separate
from the evolution of judicial decisions, “the view that the
Constitution means now what it always has, and always will, has
serious difficulties.”103 Much of the historical difficulty associated
with retroactivity rules for constitutional interpretation comes
from the fact that complex case law guides constitutional
interpretation rather than comprehensive statutes or
constitutional provisions.104 Yet, despite the traditional
recognition of the unique nature of the retroactivity of
constitutional law, the Court has retreated from this view in favor
of treating retroactivity the same for both constitutional law and
statutory interpretation.105 Today, the same presumption of
retroactivity that has always existed for statutory interpretation
now also exists for constitutional interpretation.106
Unlike adjudicative retroactivity, legislative retroactivity is
generally not appropriate.107 Despite this general presumption
that legislation is not retroactive, the matter is complicated by the
distinction between procedural legislative retroactivity and
substantive legislative retroactivity.108 While new legislation that
would have a substantive effect on litigants is prospective and does
not apply to pending cases, legislation that is considered
distinguish between old law and new law.”).
102. See id. at 1076–77 (describing the Constitution as similar to common law
in that the doctrines embodied in the text have evolved over time through judicial
decisions).
103. Id. at 1076.
104. See Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 105, 106 (2010) (explaining that, as a result of retroactivity rules
being completely judge-made, the Supreme Court has drastically changed the
rules on multiple occasions in the last fifty years).
105. See infra Part III.B (emphasizing that there is a firm rule of retroactivity
for adjudication generally).
106. See infra Part III.B (explaining why new constitutional pronouncements
are always retroactive).
107. See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory
Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1016 (2006) (“In their ideal forms, legislation is
prospective and general, while adjudication is retrospective and particular.”).
108. See Dane Reed Ullian, Note, Retroactive Application of State Long-Arm
Statutes, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1653, 1662 (2013) (noting that there is an exception to
the general prospectivity rule for procedural and remedial laws).
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procedural or remedial—not substantive—will generally have a
retroactive effect on litigants in pending cases.109 As will be
discussed later in this Note, personal jurisdiction long-arm
statutes are generally considered procedural or remedial—not
substantive—and, thus, courts apply the statutes retroactively to
litigants in cases on direct review.110
Because general personal jurisdiction as it was clarified by
Daimler should, by analogy, also be considered procedural or
remedial, it makes some sense for defendants to argue that
Daimler should be applied retrospectively for this reason.111 By
extension, it would also make sense for plaintiffs to counter with
the argument that a previous waiver of the personal jurisdiction
defense operates as an indirect restraint on retroactivity.112 Yet, as
will be argued throughout the rest of this Note, the Court’s
clarification of Goodyear through Daimler is a matter of
constitutional interpretation by the judiciary, not legislation
through a statute.113 Thus, instead of relying on a few exceptions
to the presumption of legislative prospectivity, defendants will be
able to utilize the much more advantageous firm rule of
adjudicative retroactivity.114 Unlike with the long-arm statutes,
plaintiffs will not be able to argue that there is any indirect
restraint on retroactivity, as there are no exceptions to
adjudicative retroactivity.115

109. See id. at 1663 (“Substantive laws either modify or enhance a preexisting
right or create a right where one did not exist. Procedural laws, on the other hand,
address the means by which one vindicates a preexisting right.”).
110. See infra Part III.C (explaining that this conclusion is based on
legislative retroactivity law).
111. See infra Part III.C (explaining the difference between long-arm statutes
and Supreme Court decisions in the retroactivity context).
112. See infra Part III.C (attempting to apply retroactivity law in the personal
jurisdiction context).
113. See infra Part III.B (emphasizing that the law of legislative retroactivity
does not apply to long-pending cases deciding whether to allow defendants to use
Daimler).
114. See infra Part III.B (explaining that adjudicative retroactivity is more
favorable to defendants because new constitutional pronouncements are always
retroactive).
115. See infra Part III.C (rejecting the argument that principles of legislative
retroactivity apply to the long-pending cases at issue in this Note).
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B. General Rule for Adjudicative Retroactivity
Before 1971, the law of adjudicative retroactivity was confused
and vague.116 The first attempt to coherently define the law of
adjudicative retroactivity came with the Supreme Court’s delivery
of a three-factor test for deciding whether a judgment applies
retroactively in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson.117 Because the test
operates under a presumption of retroactivity, “a litigant seeking
prospective-only application must firmly convince a court that each
factor (of the three) factors favors such a decision.”118 The Court
followed this test until the 1990s when it delivered three decisions,
the final and most decisive of which was Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation.119 Harper rejected the Chevron Oil test
and the notion that the Court could limit the retroactivity of new
constitutional decisions.120
In considering whether new law should be applied only
prospectively, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that
prospective application is justified by the potential unfairness of
one or more parties’ reliance on the previous law.121 The Court then
provided the new general rule for the retroactivity of constitutional
issues: when the Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to a
specific case before it, that rule has controlling—and retroactive—
effect for all cases open on direct review.122 Despite the Court’s
116. See Richard S. Kay, Retroactivity and Prospectivity of Judgments in
American Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 45 (2014) (describing “an initial period of
infrequent and unreflective use of non-retroactivity” by federal courts).
117. See 404 U.S. 97, 106–07 (1971) (defining the three factors as whether the
decision establishes a new principle of law, whether retroactive application will
further the purpose and effect of the rule, and whether the retroactivity could
produce inequitable results).
118. Kay, supra note 116, at 42.
119. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
120. See Kay, supra note 116, at 47–48 (noting that those three decisions were
American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990), James B.
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991), and Harper).
121. See Bradley Scott Shannon, The Retroactive and Prospective Application
of Judicial Decisions, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 811, 813 (2003) (“Eventually,
the Court reverted to a firm rule of retroactive application in criminal cases on
direct review, and now it appears to have done the same in the civil arena.”).
122. See Harper, 509 U.S. at 97 (explaining that the new interpretation must
be given retroactive effect “regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule”).
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hesitance to apply decisions retroactively for fear of disrupting
justified reliance on previous decisions, the Court articulated the
new rule in Harper in part because of the significant costs of the
case-by-case approach advocated by Chevron Oil.123 Another policy
rationale for the Harper rule was the role of the judiciary and the
separation of powers doctrine.124 As stated by Justice Scalia in his
concurrence, “Prospective decisionmaking is the handmaid of
judicial activism, and the born enemy of stare decisis.”125 As Justice
Scalia previously articulated, prospective decisionmaking would
infringe on the legislature’s domain of creating law and go beyond
the judiciary’s mandate of interpreting existing law.126
Prior to Harper—which eliminated prospectivity in the civil
arena—the Court had already established a firm rule of
retroactivity in the criminal arena with Griffith v. Kentucky127 six
years earlier.128 Although the Court was slower to eliminate
prospectivity in civil cases, the rationale for firm retroactivity is
the same in both types of cases.129 As Justice Blackmun articulated
in Griffith regarding the Court’s mandate to adjudicate specific
cases and controversies, “each case usually becomes the vehicle for
announcement of a new rule. But after we have decided a new rule
in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review requires that

123. See Mark Strasser, Constitutional Limitations and Baehr Possibilities:
On Retroactive Legislation, Reasonable Expectations, and Manifest Injustice, 29
RUTGERS L.J. 271, 304 (1998) (“Thus, the Court’s position now seems to be that it
will retroactively apply its most recent interpretation of federal law, justified
expectations or reliance interests of the parties notwithstanding.”).
124. See Kay, supra note 116, at 49 (explaining that the Court’s “deviation
from the judicial role” was a central reason for subsequent “decisions retreating
from prospective judgments”).
125. Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 105 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
126. See Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 201 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (describing the view “that prospective decisionmaking is
incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to
prescribe what it shall be”).
127. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
128. See id. at 322 (“[F]ailure to apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review violated basic norms of constitutional
adjudication.”).
129. See id. (describing the “settled principles” of judicial review that apply to
both criminal and civil cases as justification for a firm rule of retroactivity).
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we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”130
A second problem with prospectivity in both civil and criminal
cases is that such a rule would necessarily treat similarly situated
litigants differently.131 In 1993, the Court finally acknowledged
that these same principles require retroactivity in the civil arena
as well.132
An important element of the Harper retroactivity definition is
that the new Supreme Court ruling applies only to cases “open on
direct review.”133 “[T]he need for finality” justifies limiting
retroactive application of new rules to cases on direct review.134
While already-decided cases are not affected by this retroactivity
rule, all pending cases are bound by it, regardless of how long the
case has been pending.135 It does not matter that the litigants and
the courts in long-pending cases may have been relying on the
previous law for years.136 For all the costs associated with the
earlier Chevron case-by-case approach to retroactive application of
new federal rules, a significant benefit was the discretion it left to
judges to apply the prospectivity doctrine in cases in which the
retroactivity doctrine would be particularly inequitable.137 The
130. Id. at 322–23.
131. See id. at 323 (“[T]he problem with not applying new rules to cases
pending on direct review is ‘the actual inequity that results when the Court
chooses which of many similarly situated defendants should be the chance
beneficiary’ of a new rule.”).
132. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 89 (1993) (holding that,
in accord with Griffith, “this Court’s application of a rule of federal law to the
parties before the Court requires every court to give retroactive effect to that
decision”).
133. Id. at 97.
134. See James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 541 (1991)
(“[O]nce suit is barred by res judicata or by statutes of limitation or repose, a new
rule cannot reopen the door already closed.”).
135. See David Lehn, Note, Adjudicative Retroactivity as a Preclusion
Problem: Dow Chemical Co. v. Stephenson, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 563, 572
(2004) (“[I]f the balance favors retroactivity, the new law is retroactive if and only
if they are not yet final.”).
136. See Robert J. Sweeney, Note, Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation:
Of Pernicious Abstractions and the Death of Precedent, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 833,
835 (1994) (“No matter how loudly the facts of a subsequent case might scream
out for the equitable application of the non-retrospectivity doctrine, that doctrine
may no longer be used if it was not employed in the first case.”).
137. See id. at 869 (suggesting that by using Harper to overrule Chevron, “the
Court avoided the hard case where the facts might cry out for the equitable
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Chevron rule was in large part justified by a policy of fairness to
litigants who had relied on existing law.138
If Chevron was still the retroactivity rule today, it seems likely
that applying the new Daimler decision to the long-pending cases
at issue would be considered so inequitable as to justify the use of
the prospectivity doctrine.139 Such inequity is especially acute in
situations where the plaintiffs could have brought the case in a
different U.S. court where personal jurisdiction still would have
existed under Daimler.140 These plaintiffs might have brought the
case elsewhere had they known of the Daimler rule at the time, but
now are barred from doing so because of the relevant statute of
limitations.141 Statutes of limitations with tolling provisions might
aid some plaintiffs, but not all statutes allow tolling and those that
do will not benefit all plaintiffs.142 When tolling is permitted, it
operates only from the point a suit is filed until the point the suit
is dismissed.143 If a judge dismisses for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the tolling effect of filing the first action will not help
in cases filed right before the expiration of the statute of

application of the prospectivity doctrine”).
138. See Pamela J. Stephens, The New Retroactivity Doctrine: Equality,
Reliance and Stare Decisis, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1515, 1560 (1998) (“From the
earliest cases at the state and federal level, rules of law were not given retroactive
effect in order to protect those who had in good faith and with good reason relied
upon and acted in accordance with the prior rule.”).
139. See id. (noting that it would be equitable to apply the prospectivity
doctrine in cases where, “for example, a deserving litigant who had the misfortune
to bring the right lawsuit at the wrong time might be cheated out of the
opportunity to obtain a remedy”).
140. See id. (“Post-Griffith in the criminal area and post-Harper in the civil,
fairness in the sense of protecting reliance interests has given way to fairness in
the sense of equity or equal treatment.”).
141. See id. (arguing that Chevron had the capacity to avoid such extremely
inequitable consequences for plaintiffs).
142. See Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and
Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 810–11 (2006) (explaining that the
applicable state or federal statute of limitations may or may not have a
corresponding tolling provision).
143. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974) (“[T]he
mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time
limitation upon the institution of suit does not restrict the power of the federal
courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances
not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.”).
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limitations.144 Plaintiffs in these cases will not have time to refile
the suit in the appropriate jurisdiction.145 Thus, Chevron could
mitigate the unfairness to plaintiffs of dismissals in which any
tolling of the statute of limitations is inapplicable or unhelpful.146
There is a limited exception to the sometimes ineffective
nature of tolling provisions.147 Some jurisdictions allow a judge to
dismiss a case without prejudice subject to reinstatement.148 If the
plaintiff complies with the court-imposed conditions, the plaintiff
can refile the case within the time period prescribed by the
judge.149 But like tolling provisions generally, not all jurisdictions
allow this exception.150 More importantly, the exception does not
provide a solution to the unfairness of allowing defendants to raise
Daimler because a judge without jurisdiction over a defendant
cannot impose conditions regarding the case.151
The new Harper rule—unlike the Chevron rule that had the
potential to mitigate unfairness to plaintiffs—makes clear that
there is no room for any equitable exception in the retroactivity
doctrine.152 If the Supreme Court announces a new rule while a
144. See Statute of Limitations—Tolling—Dismissal, 227 F.3d 1009 (7th Cir.
2000), 16 NO. 1 FED. LITIGATOR 10, 10 (2001) (“Filing suit stops the running of the
statute of limitations—but only contingently.”).
145. See id. (describing the frequent inability of tolling provisions to address
the unfairness of statutes of limitations in the face of dismissal).
146. See id. (emphasizing the general rule that cases dismissed without
prejudice end any tolling of the statute of limitations).
147. See Don Zupanec, Statute of Limitations—Tolling—Dismissal Without
Prejudice—Reinstatement, 20 NO. 7 FED. LITIGATOR 5, 5 (2005) (“When a timely
complaint is dismissed without prejudice and the dismissal order sets conditions
for reinstatement within a specified period of time, the statute of limitations is
tolled if the conditions are satisfied by the deadline.”).
148. See id. (describing a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that this limited exception allows the statute of limitations to be
tolled if the plaintiff satisfies the conditions of reinstatement (citing Brennan v.
Kulick, 407 F.3d 603 (3rd Cir. 2005))).
149. See id. (“Because only a limited amount of time is available for satisfying
the conditions, a plaintiff must act promptly or see the dismissal become a
dismissal with prejudice and preclude refiling.”).
150. See id. (suggesting that even fewer jurisdictions recognize this exception
than those that recognize tolling).
151. See id. (emphasizing that the noted exception has extremely limited
application).
152. See Teresa A. Dondlinger, Note, Retroactivity and the Remains of
Chevron Oil After Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 47 TAX LAW. 455,
463 (1994) (“The result [of Harper] is that the issue of retroactivity will be
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case is pending, the judge presiding over the pending case must
allow litigants to utilize the new rule.153 Whereas the Chevron rule
focused on policies of fairness and reliance, the new Harper rule
focuses on a policy of equal treatment.154
It appears that, in deciding the current retroactivity rule, the
Court foresaw the potential for unfairness to plaintiffs in cases
such as those at issue in this Note, but decided to place greater
value on equality at the expense of fairness.155 The value placed on
equality prevents the Court’s decisions from applying only to a
single case when many others confronting the same issue are open
on direct review.156 The argument is that fairness and reliance—
while not unimportant—cannot coexist with equality, which the
Court has prioritized.157 In making this value judgment, it is likely
that the Court also considered separation of powers issues.158 The
making of prospective decisions is reserved to the legislature, and
allowing courts to act prospectively in any degree would defy
constitutional limits on the judiciary.159
The rule that new judicial decisions affecting constitutional
issues are retroactive, as stated in Harper, has been affirmed in

determined without regard ‘to the particular equities of individual parties’
claims.’” (quoting Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993))).
153. See id. at 466 (emphasizing that the Harper decision “virtually
guaranteed that all new rules of law will be applied retroactively”).
154. See Stephens, supra note 138, at 1560–61 (“[S]upporters of the new
retroactivity doctrines have argued that it is unfair to award one party the benefit
of a new constitutional rule, while denying it to all others similarly situated who
were not lucky enough to reach the Supreme Court first.”).
155. See id. at 1561 (describing this blanket value judgment as more difficult
to justify in the civil context than in the criminal context).
156. See Meir Katz, Note, Plainly Not “Error”: Adjudicative Retroactivity on
Direct Review, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1979, 1992 (2004) (“Retroactivity focuses
directly and exclusively upon law current at the time of decision and orders its
application to all parallel and similar cases. Equality ensures law’s integrity and
consistency.”).
157. See id. at 1993–94 (“Actual reliance, which is a major cause of
retroactivity’s adverse effects, comes about by the failure to object to settled law—
that is by passivity and silence. Such reliance invokes sympathy, and it might be
compelling if equality was not the foremost protected value.”).
158. See Stephens, supra note 138, at 1568 (noting that Harper is consistent
with constitutional limits on judicial power).
159. See id. at 1565 (describing Justice Scalia’s view that “[a]llowing judges
to render prospective rules of law encourages them to disregard established law”).
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subsequent Supreme Court cases.160 In Reynoldsville Casket Co. v.
Hyde,161 the Court dealt with the ramifications of its earlier
decision holding unconstitutional an Ohio statute that applied
different statutes of limitations to in-state and out-of-state
defendants.162 Hyde conceded that the new decision rendering the
aforementioned statute unconstitutional applied retroactively to
her case because of Harper.163 While that could have been the end
of the case, Hyde instead argued that the decision invalidating the
Ohio statute should be examined through a lens of remedy rather
than one of retroactivity.164 The Court rejected this proposed
exception to the Harper rule and held that the Harper retroactivity
rule applied to the case.165 As noted by the Court, recognizing a
remedy exception to the retroactivity rule would leave Harper with
nothing more than symbolic significance.166 In the most recent of
the subsequent cases, Danforth v. Minnesota,167 the Court justified
the Harper rule on the grounds that the judiciary does not create
new law; rather, the source of the newly articulated rule is the
Constitution itself.168 Although none of these cases accounts for the
160. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 278 n.32 (1994) (“While
it was accurate in 1974 to say that a new rule announced in a judicial decision
was only presumptively applicable to pending cases, we have since established a
firm rule of retroactivity.”).
161. 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
162. See id. at 750–51 (“In Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises,
Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988), this Court held unconstitutional (as impermissibly
burdening interstate commerce) an Ohio ‘tolling’ provision that, in effect, gave
Ohio tort plaintiffs unlimited time to sue out-of-state (but not in-state)
defendants.”).
163. See id. at 752 (“Although one might think that is the end of the matter,
Hyde ingeniously argues that it is not.”).
164. See id. (“States, she says, have a degree of legal leeway in fashioning
remedies for constitutional ills.”).
165. See id. (reversing the Supreme Court of Ohio’s holding “that, despite
Bendix, Ohio’s tolling law continues to apply to tort claims that accrued before
that decision”).
166. See id. at 754 (“If Harper has anything more than symbolic significance,
how could virtually identical reliance, without more, prove sufficient to permit a
virtually identical denial simply because it is characterized as a denial based on
‘remedy’ rather than ‘non-retroactivity?’”).
167. 552 U.S. 264 (2008).
168. See Allen, supra note 104, at 108 (explaining that retroactivity is
required because the Court is simply articulating the existing law of the
Constitution).
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possibility of waiver in the context of personal jurisdiction
defenses, the refusal of the Court to recognize exceptions in other
contexts indicates that the firm rule of retroactivity should apply
in all types of cases.169
C. Retroactivity in the Personal Jurisdiction Context
Scholars have dealt with retroactivity in the personal
jurisdiction context, but the scholarship deals primarily with the
permissibility of expanding long-arm statutes, not cutting back
jurisdiction as a constitutional matter.170 The justification for the
retroactivity of expanding long-arm statutes is firmly rooted in the
notion that such laws do not affect substantive rights.171 In McGee
v. International Life Insurance Co.,172 the characterization of
expanding long-arm statutes as procedural, and thus not affecting
substantive rights, was based on the fact that the petitioner’s
ability to litigate was not impaired or enlarged by the statute.173
In this way, cutting back jurisdiction as a constitutional
matter is fundamentally different than expanding long-arm
statutes. Whereas expanding long-arm statutes does not—as noted
by the Court in McGee—impair the ability of a plaintiff to litigate
against a defendant, cutting back jurisdiction as a constitutional
matter does just that.174 In pending cases where the statute of
limitations has often passed, the retroactive application of a more
restrictive jurisdictional rule often will completely preclude the
plaintiff from enforcing substantive rights against the defendant if
169. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 89 (1993) (failing
to note any exceptions to the firm rule of adjudicative retroactivity).
170. See Ullian, supra note 108, at 1663 (explaining that expanded long-arm
statutes can be applied retroactively because the laws are procedural).
171. See id. at 1665 (describing personal jurisdiction laws as generally
procedural because they do not affect substantive rights).
172. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
173. See id. at 224 (“The statute was remedial, in the purest sense of that
term, and neither enlarged nor impaired respondent’s substantive rights or
obligations under the contract. It did nothing more than to provide petitioner with
a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights she might have against
respondent.”).
174. See id. (explaining that the remedial statute “did nothing more than to
provide petitioner with a California forum to enforce whatever substantive rights
she might have against respondent”).
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the case is dismissed.175 In limited circumstances, however, it is
not unprecedented in the civil context to have an indirect restraint
on the general rule that all judicial decisions apply retroactively.176
Perhaps most relevant to the issue of personal jurisdiction is
the indirect restraint of statutes of limitation, as illustrated by the
following example:
[I]f a court had previously held that there was no cause of action
for a putative tort, but has now reversed itself to provide for
liability (a decision which would necessarily have retroactive
effect), the generally applicable civil tort statute of limitations
would limit the retroactive application of the decision to alleged
violations that occurred within the statutory limitations
period.177

Res judicata and collateral estoppel are two other judicially
recognized indirect restraints on the general principle that judicial
decisions apply retroactively in civil cases.178
The courts have not considered the possibility that the waiver
of personal jurisdiction defenses might be another procedural rule
serving as an indirect restraint on retroactivity.179 Yet, waiver as
an indirect restraint on the retroactive application of new judicial
decisions could support an argument that Daimler cannot always
be raised as a defense in long-pending cases.180 As discussed in the
next Part, consent-based jurisdiction through waiver might render
any lack of general personal jurisdiction irrelevant.181 This
argument might be especially persuasive in light of the courts’

175. See infra Part IV.B (explaining why this is a particularly problematic
consequence of dismissing long-pending cases).
176. See Allen, supra note 104, at 109 (defining indirect restraints as “those
in which other procedural rules serve as some external limitation on the
retroactive application of new decisions”).
177. Id. at 110.
178. See id. (explaining several examples of indirect restraints on the
retroactive effect of judicial decision in both civil and criminal cases).
179. See id. (omitting the waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense from the
list of indirect restraint examples).
180. See id. (explaining that “[i]n the civil context, there are several indirect
restraints on the application of the principle that all decisions have retrospective
effect”).
181. See infra Part IV.A (explaining the concept of submission to the court as
a primary basis for jurisdiction).
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tendencies to disfavor retroactive laws unless the law is procedural
or remedial.182
Despite the attractiveness of this waiver argument to
plaintiffs who do not want their cases dismissed as a result of
Daimler, it is highly unlikely that any court would accept it as
valid.183 The abovementioned procedural-versus-substantive law
distinction is critical in determining the retroactivity of laws
enacted by legislatures, but is meaningless when it comes to new
constitutional interpretations announced by the judiciary.184
Because the new Daimler decision is an instance of constitutional
interpretation by the judiciary, the firm rule of retroactivity
associated with all types of judicial decisions means that courts
must allow defendants to utilize Daimler.185 Even if a court
recognizes waiver as consent-based jurisdiction rendering general
personal jurisdiction irrelevant, there are limits to consent-based
jurisdiction that must apply in these long-pending cases.186 It does
not matter whether there has been a previous waiver of the
personal jurisdiction defense or how long the case has been
pending.187 The firm rule of adjudicative retroactivity requires the
application of new constitutional pronouncements in all
circumstances without exception.188

182. See Ullian, supra note 108, at 1662 (“For procedural or remedial laws, a
court reverses the [presumption that laws are prospective] and applies the law
retroactively unless the legislature clearly intended for the law to apply
prospectively only.”).
183. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Daimler decision is an example
of constitutional interpretation by the judiciary and that such interpretations
always operate retroactively).
184. See supra Part III.B (emphasizing that today there is a firm rule of
retroactivity for all judicial decisions).
185. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the current retroactivity doctrine
for civil cases does not provide for any exceptions).
186. See infra Part IV (describing the relevant due process limits on consentbased jurisdiction).
187. See infra Part IV (emphasizing that the firm rule of adjudicative
retroactivity requires retroactive application of Daimler).
188. See supra Part III.B (explaining that the Supreme Court has never
provided any exceptions to adjudicative retroactivity).
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IV. Permitting Defendants to Raise the Daimler Test in
Long-Pending Cases
A. Two Categories of Cases Affected by the Daimler Decision
There are two categories of cases affected by the Daimler
decision: those in which the defendant raised a Rule 12(b)(2)
defense before the Daimler decision189 and those in which the
defendant did not.190
1. First Category: When the Defendant Raised a Rule 12(b)(2)
Defense Before Daimler
The determinative factor in the first category is that the
objection to personal jurisdiction can be renewed at any stage of
the court proceedings.191 Furthermore, participating in litigation
before pursuing a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is
acceptable if the defendant raised the defense in an answer.192 In
renewing the previously asserted objection to personal jurisdiction,
the defendant will be able to benefit from any new standards and
rules regarding the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction.193
Thus, the new Daimler precedent applies through direct review in
this first category of cases.194 The U.S. District Court for the
189. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (describing a case in
which the defendant did raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense prior to Daimler).
190. See, e.g., Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284D, 2014 WL 4471606, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept 10, 2014) (describing a situation in
which the defendant failed to raise a Rule 12(b)(2) defense prior to Daimler).
191. See Don Zupanec, Jurisdictional Defense—Waiver—Request for
Affirmative Relief, 24 NO. 2 FED. LITIGATOR 10, 10 (2009) (explaining that raising
the defense for lack of personal jurisdiction by motion under Rule 12(b) or in the
answer “will preserve the defense”).
192. See Don Zupanec, Personal Jurisdiction Defense—Waiver, 21 NO. 9 FED.
LITIGATOR 2, 2 (2006) (emphasizing that “a personal jurisdiction defense is not
necessarily forfeited by a plaintiff’s failure to move promptly to dismiss on
jurisdictional grounds after raising the defense in a responsive pleading”).
193. See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 97 (1993) (emphasizing
that adjudicative retroactivity is a strict rule without any exceptions when it
comes to pending cases).
194. See id. (providing the rule that full retroactive effect of all new judicial
decisions must be given in all cases still open on direct review).
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Southern District of Florida provides an example of the
straightforward application of this rule with Aronson v. Celebrity
Cruises, Inc.195 In that case—presumably because the law is so
settled—the court did not even provide an analysis of why it was
appropriate to apply the new Daimler decision.196 The court simply
accepted that an earlier motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction could be renewed.197 It then dismissed the claim based
on its application of Daimler.198
2. Second Category: When the Defendant Did Not Raise a Rule
12(b)(2) Defense Before Daimler
The fact that the waiver doctrine of the personal jurisdiction
defense is often inconsistently applied makes determining whether
to apply Daimler in the second category of cases more
complicated.199 For example, there is a history of basing
jurisdiction on submission to the court—what Rule 12 calls
waiver—and, generally, if there is one basis for jurisdiction, an
additional basis is not required.200 Thus, if the basis for jurisdiction
is consent through waiver, then there is an argument that general
personal jurisdiction is not required at all.201 This would mean that
195. See 30 F. Supp. 3d 1379, 1391 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (granting defendant’s
renewed motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the new
Daimler decision).
196. See id. (dismissing the claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2)).
197. See id. (omitting any discussion of the validity of the renewed motion to
dismiss).
198. See id. (“Given the extent of the California contacts deemed insufficient
to establish general jurisdiction in Daimler, it is difficult to see how this Court
could exercise general jurisdiction over Wrave based on its more attenuated
contacts with Florida.”).
199. See Christina M. Manfredi, Comment, Waiving Goodbye to Personal
Jurisdiction Defenses: Why United States Courts Should Maintain a Rebuttable
Presumption of Preclusion and Waiver Within the Context of International
Litigation, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 233, 236–37 (2008) (explaining that the
inconsistent application of the waiver doctrine is especially prevalent with
international defendants).
200. See Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal
Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 849, 894 (1989) (“Jurisdiction based on
waiver, implied consent, or express contract is defensible as species of a knowing
and intended submission to the jurisdiction of the state.”).
201. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47
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there is nothing unlawful about a judge not applying the new
Daimler precedent because jurisdiction is based on consent rather
than general personal jurisdiction.202 But as the controversy at
issue in this Note demonstrates, courts have recognized that it is
important to establish limits to consent-based jurisdiction.203 Such
limits are especially important when the defendant did not have
the opportunity to establish other grounds for lack of jurisdiction
because of the case law that existed at the time of consent.204
There should be relief from consent-based jurisdiction when
the consenting defendant did not have notice of an available
jurisdictional defense.205 While courts will generally deem the
expressly consenting parties of a forum selection clause as
knowingly waiving all jurisdictional defenses, there is no such
notice when parties impliedly consent to jurisdiction.206 When
consent is implicit and the jurisdictional defense comes from a
change in personal jurisdiction law, the question is whether the
law changed enough to conclude that the defendant did not have
notice of that defense prior to the pronouncement of the new law.207
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1073 (2012) (explaining that, independent of a general
personal jurisdiction analysis, “consent is a proper basis for jurisdiction”).
202. See Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying and Coherent
Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 139 (1992) (“The
personal jurisdiction defense is a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment that can be knowingly and voluntarily waived.”).
203. See Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked
in the National Debate About “Class Action Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1344
(2005) (explaining that, historically, consent to jurisdiction has been “limited to
particular claims”).
204. See id. at 1364 (“State-extracted waiver or consent to jurisdiction is
subject to a due process inquiry, although the test is difficult to identify.”).
205. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S.
694, 703–04 (1982) (suggesting that express or implied consent is valid when
parties have notice of the waived jurisdictional defenses).
206. See, e.g., Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 316 (1964)
(providing that express consent to jurisdiction in a particular state is valid
because the contract provided both parties with notice of the waiver of other
jurisdictional defenses); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595
(1991) (providing that forum selection clauses are valid unless the clause is
fundamentally unfair).
207. See Linda Sandstrom Simard, Exploring the Limits of Specific Personal
Jurisdiction, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1619, 1658 (2001) (explaining that due process
limitations are more of a concern with implied consent than with express
consent).
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If the change was such that the case law existing at the time of
consent did not put the defendant on notice of the personal
jurisdiction defense, then the change entitles the defendant to
relief from consent-based jurisdiction.208 But if the previous case
law did provide the defendant with notice of the newly pronounced
personal jurisdiction defense, then there is no such relief.209
Because Daimler provided its own distinct test on how to apply the
at home standard, the case law existing at the time of defendants’
consent in long-pending cases did not provide adequate notice of
the personal jurisdiction defense pronounced in Daimler.210
Furthermore, strict adherence to consent-based jurisdiction
would render the new Daimler precedent irrelevant in longpending cases.211 In practice, the fact that several judges presiding
over these long-pending cases have accepted that defendants can
assert general personal jurisdiction as an additional basis for
jurisdiction provides evidence of the rejection of such strict
adherence.212 The practical rejection of consent as the sole basis for
jurisdiction in these long-pending cases is likely a recognition of
the unfairness of this limitation to defendants.213 The injustice is
obvious in cases in which the case law existing at the time of
consent was not sufficient grounds for establishing a lack of
general personal jurisdiction.214 In light of this practical rejection
208. See id. at 1659 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not delineate the scope of implied consent according to the legal theory
pursued. . . . Rather, the scope of the plaintiff’s implied consent is defined in terms
of what would be necessary for a fair resolution of the litigation between the
parties.”).
209. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 456 U.S. at 704 (emphasizing that an effective
waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense must be intentional).
210. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text (describing this Note’s
recommendation on how to reconcile Daimler and Goodyear).
211. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that there have been real consequences
in long-pending cases because of Daimler).
212. See, e.g., Fed. Home Loan Bank of Bos. v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *4 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (permitting dismissal
based on lack of general personal jurisdiction); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768
F.3d 122, 134 (2d Cir. 2014) (determining that, in light of Daimler, the district
court erred in finding that it could exercise general jurisdiction over the appellant
bank).
213. See infra Part IV.B (describing the harsh consequences of dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction in long-pending cases).
214. See supra Part II.C (emphasizing that Daimler did change the existing
personal jurisdiction law).
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and the clear relevance of Daimler in the long-pending cases at
issue, it seems that new cases developing the law of general
personal jurisdiction do operate as a limit on consent as the sole
basis for jurisdiction.215 Thus, this Note similarly rejects the
validity of the notion that consent can serve as the sole basis for
jurisdiction in these long-pending cases.216
In accepting that general personal jurisdiction remains
important regardless of consent-based jurisdiction in such cases,
the timing of the assertion of a Rule 12 defense based on new case
law is critical.217 Waiting too long to assert a Rule 12 defense after
the Daimler decision could suggest that the defendant consents to
jurisdiction even in the face of existing developments in general
personal jurisdiction case law.218 Holzsager v. Valley Hospital219
explains that “a party cannot be deemed to have waived objections
or defenses which were not known to be available at the time they
could first have been made, especially when it does raise the
objections as soon as their cognizability is made apparent.”220 The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed whether
the court below erred in declining to apply retroactively an
intervening Supreme Court decision about personal jurisdiction.221
In reversing the lower court’s decision, the Second Circuit rejected
the appellee’s argument that the appellant could constructively
waive a personal jurisdiction defense that did not exist at the time
waiver would occur.222 Thus, personal jurisdiction is not waived
215. See infra Part IV.B (describing the practical relevance of Daimler in longpending cases).
216. See infra Part IV.B (describing how general personal jurisdiction has
resulted in real dismissals even when there is an argument for consent-based
jurisdiction).
217. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (determining when a defense based on lack of
personal jurisdiction is deemed waived).
218. See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1, 23 (1991) (emphasizing that consent is “one of the primary bases” for
jurisdiction and that consent is the equivalent of failure to state an objection).
219. 646 F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1981).
220. Id. at 796.
221. See id. at 793 (explaining that the defendant wanted to utilize the Court’s
decision in Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), which held that “a plaintiff
cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant through quasiin-rem attachment of an insurance policy issued to the defendant by the
defendant’s resident insurer”).
222. See id. at 795 (describing additional arguments put forth by appellee and
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where intervening Supreme Court decisions declare current
personal jurisdictional law unconstitutional.223 But if there is too
much of a delay between the newly available objection and when
the party raises the objection, the party risks waiving the
defense.224
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expanded on
the appropriate application of the Holzsager rule in Bennett v. City
of Holyoke.225 This court explicitly limited the waiver exception to
circumstances in which the authoritative case at the time of the
waiver precluded the defense or a supervening authority made the
defense available only after the waiver.226 In sum, an earlier
waiver is excused “only when the defense, if timely asserted, would
have been futile under binding precedent.”227 The Supreme Court
also addressed this waiver issue in a context other than personal
jurisdiction.228 The Court explained that for a waiver to be
effective, it must “be one of a ‘known right or privilege.’”229 There
is no waiver of a defense when the decision that would support that
defense does not exist yet.230
Applying this Holzsager rule to long-pending cases potentially
affected by Daimler, one of the crucial questions is whether
Daimler announced a new constitutional rule or overruled
Goodyear.231 The issue is further complicated because there is a
legitimate argument that Daimler simply clarified the personal
jurisdiction law that already existed after Goodyear.232
rejected by the Second Circuit).
223. See id. at 796 (explaining that a right cannot be waived if the right is not
known at the time waiver would occur).
224. See id. (noting that failure to raise an immediate defense based on the
newly available authority will be considered waiver).
225. See Bennett v. City of Holyoke, 362 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (providing
the two situations in which the Holzsager exception applies).
226. See id. (noting that these two circumstances require application of the
“equitable exception”).
227. Id.
228. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 142 (1967) (addressing waiver
in the context of a party failing to assert certain arguments before trial).
229. Id. at 143 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
230. See id. (describing the common sense notion that a party cannot waive a
defense that does not exist).
231. See supra Part II.C (examining both sides of this Daimler debate).
232. See supra Part II.C (proposing that this argument is flawed).
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In Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Government
Authority,233 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
referenced Holzsager in its analysis of whether the defendants
waived the personal jurisdiction defense.234 The court correctly
described the Holzsager rule as providing an exception to waiver of
a defense when the legal basis for the defense did not exist yet,
except when the defendant does not raise the defense based on the
newly available authority in a timely manner.235 Where the court
was incorrect, however, was in its determination that Goodyear
provided the same legal basis for the defense as Daimler and, thus,
the waiver exception did not apply.236 Thus, the court denied the
waiver exception to defendants based on its conclusion that
Daimler did not announce a new constitutional rule.237
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
reached the same conclusion based on the Holzsager rule in
American Fidelity Assurance Co. v. Bank of New York Mellon.238
This court also accurately articulated the Holzsager waiver
exception and similarly rejected the defendant’s contention that
Daimler provided a legal basis for the general personal jurisdiction
defense distinct from Goodyear.239 Like the Gilmore court, this
court ignored the fact that while Daimler did preserve the
underlying premise of Goodyear, the clearer and much more
specific Daimler rule does constitute a new constitutional
pronouncement.240
233. 8 F. Supp. 3d 9 (D.D.C. 2014).
234. See id. at 13 (emphasizing that the Holzsager rule requires parties to
immediately raise a newly available defense).
235. See id. (explaining that “an unavailable defense is not, under Rule 12(h),
waived by omission from an earlier Rule 12 motion”).
236. See id. at 15 (arguing that Goodyear and Daimler pronounced the same
at home standard).
237. See id. (explaining correctly that the Holzsager waiver exception applies
only to previously unavailable defenses).
238. See Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014
WL 4471606, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014) (concluding that Daimler did not
change the Goodyear rule).
239. See id. at *2 (reaching the incorrect conclusion that “Daimler did not
create a basis for challenging personal jurisdiction not previously available to
Defendant”).
240. See id. at *3 (focusing too narrowly on the underlying at home standard
maintained by both Goodyear and Daimler).
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If, as this Note argues, the Gilmore and American Fidelity
conclusions were incorrect, then there is also the question of
whether waiver matters at all in light of the retroactivity of new
constitutional pronouncements. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that it did not matter in
Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd.241 But even though the court agreed
with the defendants that their failure to raise the personal
jurisdiction defense before Daimler did not constitute waiver, the
seven-month delay between the Daimler decision and the
defendants’ assertion of the defense did result in its waiver.242
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York
has adhered to the view that if there is a new test for determining
the constitutionality of personal jurisdiction, the defendants have
the right to use it.243 This district has decided to apply the new
Daimler test even when the defendants ignored possible personal
jurisdiction defenses up until the release of the Daimler
decision.244 This seems to be the correct decision based on the
conclusion that Daimler did expand upon the Goodyear at home
standard and thus, should be considered a new constitutional
decision.245 Because new constitutional decisions must be given
retroactive effect, this court correctly allowed the defendants to
use Daimler even in the face of their previous failure to raise any
personal jurisdiction defenses.246
241. See Laydon v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., No. 12 Civ. 3419(GBD), 2015 WL
1499185, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2015) (“This Court agrees with the NonStipulating Defendants that their Rule 12(b)(2) jurisdictional defense was not
available before Daimler.”).
242. See id. at *7 (“Defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defenses by
failing to promptly assert them after Daimler was decided.”).
243. See Brush, supra note 1 (explaining that a bank defendant was allowed
to use Daimler in September and have a long-pending case dismissed); see also
Laydon, 2015 WL 1499185, at *6 (refusing to rule that the defendants waived
their personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it prior to the Daimler
decision).
244. See Brush, supra note 1 (describing the banking defendants as having
“‘sat on their hands’ with regard to jurisdictional defenses prior to this August”
by not pursuing any personal jurisdiction defense until the Daimler decision); see
also Laydon, 2015 WL 1499185, at *6 (“[T]his Court does not rule that the NonStipulating Defendants waived their personal jurisdiction defenses because they
failed to raise them in their June 2013 motions to dismiss.”).
245. See supra Part II.C (arguing that Daimler changed the Goodyear rule
even though the two decisions are not inconsistent).
246. See supra Part III.B (stating the conclusiveness of the Supreme Court’s
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Not all courts, however, have adhered to this reconciliation
of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction and retroactivity
decisions. In American Fidelity, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma found that waiver of the personal
jurisdiction defense did preclude the defendant from asserting
the new Daimler test and denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 247 Both this
interpretation of waiver and the court’s interpretation of the
Daimler holding are of real importance to this Note’s argument. 248
Because this court views Daimler as simply clarifying Goodyear
rather than articulating a new test altogether, the court finds
that the same defense was available to the defendant even before
the Daimler decision.249 Yet, the defendant still chose to waive the
personal jurisdiction defense.250
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Gilmore
also held that the waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense
precludes the defendant from asserting the new Daimler test.251
That court also based its decision on the assertion that Goodyear
already stated the rule, which Daimler simply clarified.252 Based
on the earlier discussion of Daimler in relation to Goodyear, it

position that new constitutional decisions must be given full retroactive effect).
247. See Am. Fid. Assur. Co. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, No. CIV-11-1284-D, 2014
WL 4471606, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 10, 2014) (“Granting such relief would be
inconsistent with the Court’s finding that Defendant has waived the lack of
personal jurisdiction defense.”).
248. See id. at *3 (“Indeed, multiple statements by the Court in Daimler
demonstrate that the standard Defendant relies upon was clearly first expressed
in Goodyear.”).
249. See id. at *5 (“Goodyear announced the ‘at home’ standard relied upon by
Defendant. Because that standard was available more than two years ago,
Defendant has not demonstrated the defense of lack of general personal
jurisdiction was ‘unavailable’ until January 2014 when Daimler was decided.”).
250. See id. (explaining that the same, or at least a very similar, personal
jurisdiction defense was always available to the defendant).
251. See Gilmore v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., 8 F. Supp. 3d 9, 17
(D.D.C. 2014) (“Defendants forfeited their jurisdictional defense both by omitting
it from their 2002 Motion to Dismiss and by failing to promptly assert it after
Goodyear was decided. Consequently the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over
them.”).
252. See id. at 15 (“Even if Defendants were correct that a legal basis to
challenge the Court’s jurisdiction did not exist until the announcement of the ‘at
home’ rule . . . they are flat-out wrong that Daimler was the genesis of that rule.”).
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seems that these two courts ruled incorrectly.253 Because these
courts anchored their reasoning on the assumption that Daimler
did not change Goodyear, the argument that Daimler provides new
guidance on how to apply Goodyear disrupts the soundness of the
two courts’ conclusions.254 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
established that new constitutional decisions are retroactive, so
the two courts’ waiver arguments depend upon the position that
Daimler did not change Goodyear.255 Because such a position is not
in accord with Daimler, the waiver argument cannot stand and the
defendants in these two cases—like those in all long-pending
cases—should have been allowed to raise Daimler.256
B. Consequences of Applying the Daimler Decision in
Long-Pending Cases
The most problematic consequence of courts applying the new
Daimler decision in long-pending cases is the possibility of the case
being dismissed outright.257 As discussed in the previous subpart,
statutes of limitations make dismissal especially unfair to
plaintiffs.258 Even if the statute of limitations had not expired and
the plaintiff could bring the case again in a different jurisdiction,
the case would have to start over from the beginning.259
Transferring the case instead would allow the plaintiff to pick the

253. See supra Part II.C (arguing that although Daimler is consistent with
Goodyear, the new decision did offer additional guidance and clarification not
present in Goodyear).
254. See supra Part II.C (noting that Daimler did expand upon Goodyear’s at
home standard).
255. See supra Part III.B (explaining the significance of Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)).
256. See supra Part III.B (stating the rule that full retroactive effect must be
given to all new constitutional decisions for cases on direct review).
257. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (listing recent cases in which
judges granted dismissals).
258. See Allen, supra note 104, at 109 (describing statutes of limitations as an
indirect restraint on retroactivity).
259. See Jeremy Jay Butler, Note, Venue Transfer When a Court Lacks
Personal Jurisdiction: Where Are Courts Going with 28 U.S.C. § 1631?, 40 VAL. U.
L. REV. 789, 789 (2006) (noting that transfer avoids the unnecessary step of
refiling a claim in a different court).
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case up where it left off in the first jurisdiction.260 Furthermore,
federal law instructs district courts to transfer rather than dismiss
when possible and “in the interest of justice.”261 Yet, judges are
afforded discretion in deciding what is in the interest of justice and
many are using that discretion to choose dismissal over transfer.262
In Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston v. Ally Financial,
Inc.,263 the judge presiding over the case rejected the plaintiff’s
motion to sever and transfer the claims affected by the new
personal jurisdiction argument.264 Even though there would have
been personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York, to
which the defendant requested the case be transferred, the judge
decided instead to dismiss all claims lacking personal jurisdiction
in Massachusetts, where the claims had been brought.265 In light
of the previous discussion, the judge was correct in allowing the
defendant to utilize the new Daimler decision.266 Had there not
been any other federal court with personal jurisdiction over the
defendants, the judge also would have been correct in denying the
plaintiff’s motion to transfer.267 But that was not the situation in
this case.268 Out of consideration of relevant statutes of limitations
260. See id. at 789 (“Venue transfer is one aspect of venue that Congress
created to improve the efficient change of courtrooms when either the public or
the defendant demands a more convenient forum.”).
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (2012).
262. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (explaining that dismissals are
being granted even when transfer is an option).
263. No. 11-10952-GAO, 2014 WL 4964506 (D. Mass. Mar. 9, 2012).
264. See David McAfee, Daimler Frees Moody’s, S&P From Bank’s $5.9B MBS
Suit, LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2014, 9:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
583381/daimler-frees-moody-s-s-p-from-bank-s-5-9b-mbs-suit (last visited Sept.
28, 2015) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss based on lack of personal
jurisdiction in light of the Daimler ruling) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
265. See id. (“Judge O’Toole rejected the Bank of Boston’s bid to sever the
rating agency claims and transfer them to the Southern District of New York,
where personal jurisdiction over them exists, instead deciding to dismiss them in
their entirety.”).
266. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that personal jurisdiction and retroactivity
law requires judges to allow defendants to use the new Daimler decision even
when personal jurisdiction defenses have already been waived).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (providing that cases can be transferred
only to another district where the case “might have been brought” or to which “all
parties have consented”).
268. See McAfee, supra note 264 (noting that there was another federal court
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in long-pending cases, the judge should not have dismissed the
case when transfer was a lawful alternative.269
Another possible consequence of courts applying the Daimler
decision in long-pending cases is the special treatment of foreign
defendants at the expense of domestic plaintiffs. One of the main
differences between the Court’s opinions in Daimler and Goodyear
is that Daimler provides a lengthy discussion on the risk that
expansive personal jurisdiction poses to international comity
whereas Goodyear only refers to the issue in one footnote.270 The
concern stems from consideration of the fact that outside of the
United States, most nations have a much more restrictive idea of
when defendants should be subject to personal jurisdiction in any
given forum.271
Looking at Daimler generally, the decision makes litigation
against foreign corporations much more difficult.272 It is possible
that some courts might be looking for reasons to allow foreign
defendants to use the new Daimler test, even when personal
jurisdiction defenses have been waived, to “accord with the fair
play and substantial justice due process demands.”273 Additionally,
courts might be choosing to dismiss cases that could easily be

with personal jurisdiction over the defendants).
269. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (providing that judges can transfer cases when
transfer is “in the interest of justice”).
270. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (“Other nations
do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction advanced by the
Court of Appeals in this case.”); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 n.5 (2011) (describing the French law that permits
jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s relationship with the forum).
271. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (“In the European Union, for example, a
corporation may generally be sued in the nation in which it is ‘domiciled,’ a term
defined to refer only to the location of the corporation’s ‘statutory seat,’ ‘central
administration,’ or ‘principal place of business.’”).
272. See Denker, supra note 92, at 164 (“Since Daimler provides a clear,
narrow rule that denotes where a Non-U.S. corporation is subject to liability,
plaintiffs will have a harder time justifying a lawsuit against a Non-U.S.
corporation.”); see also Pertlette Michéle Jura et al., Disparate Treatment of the
Corporate Citizen: Stark Differences Across Borders in Transnational Lawsuits,
15 No. 2 BUS. L. INT’L 85, 92 (2014) (indicating that Daimler is part of the Court’s
attempt “to make clear that already overburdened US courts are not required to
entertain multinational suits having little or nothing to do with the US—and in
some cases (perhaps many)—they do not have the jurisdictional power to do so”).
273. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
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transferred.274 Expansive jurisdiction tests create an international
comity problem because they allow “any forum in the United States
to resolve any dispute arising anywhere in the world.”275 The
Daimler ruling prompts judges to decline to exercise jurisdiction
over many foreign corporate defendants, thus mitigating the
problem.276 Instead, the courts simply accept the judgments of
foreign jurisdictions.277
A related motivation for allowing defendants in long-pending
cases to utilize Daimler is that the decision provides an incentive
for foreign companies to invest and conduct business in the United
States and consequently has the potential to stimulate the U.S.
economy.278 The stricter guidance for the at home standard
provided by Daimler gives foreign companies more certainty about
“the jurisdictional consequences of their actions” in the United
States, which in turn minimizes the risk of doing business in and
with the United States.279
As mentioned above, this special treatment of foreign
defendants in the interest of international comity comes at a cost
for U.S. plaintiffs.280 With Daimler, “[g]eneral jurisdiction, the sole
274. See Denker, supra note 92, at 170 (explaining that courts want to avoid
raising “tensions between the United States and other nations”).
275. Id.
276. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014) (explaining the
view of the Solicitor General that “foreign governments’ objections to some
domestic courts’ expansive views of general jurisdiction have in the past impeded
negotiations of international agreements on the reciprocal recognition and
enforcement of judgments”).
277. See id. (noting that lenient bases for the exercise of general personal
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant often lead to international friction).
278. See Denker, supra note 92, at 166–67 (“Because the type of ‘litigation
environment critically influences a foreign company’s decision to invest in the
United States,’ it is clear that lower anticipated costs will lead to more capital
investment.”).
279. See id. at 166 (“[W]hen a corporation can predict which forums have the
capability of holding it liable, it has the ability to buy insurance, the opportunity
to incorporate the costs of potential litigation into its products’ prices, and the
chance to decide whether to operate in a state whose costs outweigh its benefits.”).
280. See Kate Bonacorsi, Note, Not at Home with “At-Home” Jurisdiction, 37
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1821, 1853 (2014) (“[G]eneral jurisdiction occasionally served
as a jurisdictional basis of last resort. When US plaintiffs could not make
showings sufficient for specific jurisdiction, especially in cases against non-US
corporations, courts allowed plaintiffs to make a showing of the defendant’s
‘continuous and systematic’ business activities in the forum state.”).
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door to relief for U.S. plaintiffs when the minimum contacts
approach was otherwise too narrow, is now officially closed.”281 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor addressed this injustice to
individuals harmed by the actions of the multinational
corporations benefitting from the Daimler decision.282 In many
instances, Daimler may result in foreign corporate defendants
never being held accountable for their actions against U.S.
plaintiffs.283 This cost is especially severe for the plaintiffs in the
long-pending cases that are being dismissed as a result of courts
allowing foreign defendants to utilize the new Daimler decision
even when those defendants previously waived the personal
jurisdiction defense.284
Judges should act in accordance with both personal
jurisdiction and retroactivity law by allowing these foreign
defendants to utilize the new Daimler decision.285 Moreover, judges
should mitigate the cost to plaintiffs of using Daimler in longpending cases by transferring the case when possible.286 In the case
of foreign defendants, however, there often will be no venue in the
United States with personal jurisdiction over the defendant when
the Daimler rule is applied.287 Thus, judges will overwhelmingly
281. Id.
282. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 773 (2014) (“[F]or example,
a parent whose child is maimed due to the negligence of a foreign hotel owned by
a multinational conglomerate will be unable to hold the hotel to account in a
single U.S. court, even if the hotel company has a massive presence in multiple
States.”).
283. See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward
a New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 222 (2014)
(“If plaintiffs are injured outside their home state, they must sue in the
defendant’s home state or in the location where they suffered the injury, even if
the defendant has substantial operations in the plaintiff’s home state.”).
284. See Bonacorsi, supra note 280, at 1857 (emphasizing the unfairness to
plaintiffs resulting from Daimler and that “the Court once again favored
defendants to the detriment of US plaintiffs”).
285. See supra Part IV.A (arguing that new constitutional decisions should be
given full retroactive effect even in the face of waiver of the personal jurisdiction
defense).
286. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that judges should exercise their discretion
to transfer “in the interest of justice” to plaintiffs in long-pending cases with
expired statutes of limitations).
287. See Denker, supra note 92, at 164 (stating the severely limiting effect of
the Daimler decision on personal jurisdiction in the United States over foreign
defendants).
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dismiss these cases, leaving no alternative remedy for plaintiffs to
pursue within the United States. While this result is certainly
unfair to many plaintiffs, and in part a consequence of
international comity concerns, it is the correct result in light of
personal jurisdiction and retroactivity law.288 Still, judges should
continue to exercise their discretion to transfer cases rather than
dismiss where another venue in the United States has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, whether that defendant is
domestic or foreign.
V. Conclusion
In the interests of fairness and predictability, the controversy
encapsulated by Judge Daniels’s comment requires a consistent
solution to be applied across federal courts.289 For the solution to
be lawful, it must account for both personal jurisdiction law and
retroactivity law. An analysis of the development of personal
jurisdiction law indicates that Daimler did more than restate the
Goodyear test. Rather, Daimler narrowed the scope of general
personal jurisdiction beyond what any defendant could have
reasonably believed was required by Goodyear. Next, an analysis
of the current state of retroactivity law in the civil context reveals
a strict rule of adjudicative retroactivity. There is no permissible
exception to this rule for new constitutional pronouncements in the
personal jurisdiction context, not even in the face of waiver. Thus—
because Daimler was a new constitutional pronouncement of
personal jurisdiction law—defendants should be allowed to utilize
Daimler regardless of whether they previously raised a Rule
12(b)(2) defense.
While this reconciliation of the law clearly demands that
Daimler apply in long-pending cases, this solution poses problems
of its own. In many cases, the application of Daimler results in a
determination that the court can no longer exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant. If the court consequently dismisses the case, a
288. See supra Parts II–III (explaining why personal jurisdiction law and
retroactivity law, respectively, require this result).
289. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing the view that
Daimler is a new constitutional test that defendants in long-pending cases are
entitled to utilize).
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plaintiff whose cause of action now has an expired statute of
limitations will be left without a judicial remedy. Thus, when
transfer is possible in cases that would otherwise be dismissed
because of lack of personal jurisdiction under Daimler, judges
should make every effort to allow transfer. A dismissal would be
especially unfair in cases where the defendant waived the personal
jurisdiction defense, and the plaintiff continued with litigation in
reliance on such waiver. Because of the special impact of Daimler
on foreign defendants, however, it will sometimes be the case that
no court in the United States will be able to exercise jurisdiction
under Daimler. Courts should limit the harsh consequences of
dismissal in long-pending cases to these cases in which there is no
other alternative.

